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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, land use planning and urban
development practices increasingly have come to prioritize
“planning for density.” Put differently, government officials at all
levels have embraced the goal of promoting and developing dense,
mixed-land-use, walkable urban environments, rather than
dispersed, sprawling single-land-use, auto-dependent suburban
ones. The trend is perhaps most evident in efforts to densify and
redevelop center cities, although many suburban communities,
both old and new, also have embraced the goal of planning for
density and revised their planning practices accordingly.
The planning for density toolkit is expansive, spanning both
mandatory rules and voluntary incentives. These tools include:
smart-growth and growth-management policies that seek to direct
new development into built-up areas and restrict new suburban
development;1 regional government devices that aim to address
interlocal inequities and rationalize development within
metropolitan areas;2 urban development efforts, including tax
*
John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The
ideas in this Article were originally presented at the Spring 2017 Environmental
Distinguished Lecture at Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful to the
Program on Environmental, Energy, and Land Use Law for inviting me to deliver the
lecture and to the Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law for agreeing to publish a
paper based upon my remarks.
1. See,
e.g.,
About
Smart
Growth,
U.S.
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/
smartgrowth/about-smart-growth#smartgrowth (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); APA
Policy
Guide
on
Smart
Growth,
AM.
PLAN.
ASS’N
(Apr.
14,
2012),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm.
2. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); NEAL R. PEIRCE WITH CURTIS W. JOHNSON & JOHN
STUART HALL, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
(1993); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1136–41 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the
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increment financing and other economic development incentives,
urban infill, and brownfield remediation efforts;3 and “new
urbanist” planning and development practices, including
innovative and increasingly popular regulatory alternatives to
Euclidian zoning.4 None of this is to say that we do not continue to
build sprawling suburbs, because we certainly do. But it is to say
that both regulators and developers are more focused—or at least
focused with more intentionality—on density than they were in
past generations.
Proponents of planning for density argue that it holds many
promises—economic, ecological, and social5—but they tend to
disregard or dismiss the reality that there are perils and
paradoxes associated with these practices as well. In this essay, I
explore these perils and paradoxes. I do so as a proponent of urban
density. In the interest of full disclosure, I grew up in suburban
Kansas City, and I understand and respect Americans’ affinity for
suburbia. But I have—to the befuddlement of my suburbanite
family members—come to consider myself a convert to urbanism.6
An authentic religious conversion usually entails a careful study of
a new faith—including the confrontation and engagement with its
limitations and failings—that leads to the conviction that it holds
the truth despite its flaws. The same, I think, is true of a
conversion to urbanism. I have written extensively about how land
use planning, policing, and education policies can be employed to
help urban communities thrive.7 This work has led to the
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J.
1985, 2034–37 (2000).
3. See generally NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING,
AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 82–85 (2010) [hereinafter GARNETT, ORDERING
THE CITY]; Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65 (2010); Empowerment Zones,
Renewal and Enterprise Communities, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://egis-hud.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/23a64021cec34a8d99b159a58c535d0d_0
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018); Overview of the Brownfields Program, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-brownfields-program (last visited Jan. 1, 2018);
Urban Infill and Brownfield Redevelopment, SUSTAINABLE CITIES INST., NAT’L. LEAGUE OF
CITIES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.nlc.org/resource/urban-infill-brownfields-redevelopment.
4. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571,
580 n.34 (2013). See also What is New Urbanism?, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM,
https://www.cnu.org/resources/what-new-urbanism (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (summarizing
the principles of new urbanism).
5. See infra Part II.
6. My husband and I live what passes for an “urban” life in South Bend, Indiana. We
have chosen to raise our family in a modest, century-old house located less than a mile from
both the university where I work and downtown South Bend; our children have all attended
an urban Catholic parish school founded more than 150 years ago.
7. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 3, at 83–87; MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE STELLE
GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST COMMUNITY: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS’ IMPORTANCE IN URBAN
AMERICA 2–4 (2014); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle
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conviction that the only successful way to promote policies that
encourage density and urban vitality is to face the reality that
these practices are not costless—and to find ways to address their
costs. That is, I have come to believe that the case for density must
reflect both a conviction that density is worth promoting and an
understanding that planning for density is hardly a panacea. In
other words, we need to be smarter about smart growth.
This essay proceeds in three parts. The first briefly describes
the social, economic, ecological, and political dynamics fueling the
trend toward planning for density. This section focuses, in
particular, on the motivations of those promoting the tools in the
planning-for-density toolkit, outlining the promises that
proponents argue that these tools hold. The second addresses the
perils of mandatory planning devices that seek to achieve density.
The final section discusses a paradox of planning for diversity that
virtually nobody considers, but which I believe may offer a path
forward.
II. THE PROMISES OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY
The current focus on planning for density results from the
confluence of a number of factors. The first is the fact that elite
residential preferences, especially among young professionals,
increasingly have come—for a variety of reasons—to favor urban
life.8 These shifting preferences have fueled an urban comeback in
some cities,9 leading many urban leaders to focus on building the
Class City, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 202–04 (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the
Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995, 1998–99 (2012); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering
(and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2004); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating
Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1077–81 (2005); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop
the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 598, 621–25 (2006); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2012) [hereinafter The People Paradox].
8. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275 (2006) (attributing the increased desire to live in urban
areas to a rise in income and education levels and a decline in crime rates).
9. See, e.g., Joe Cortright, Surging City Center Job Growth, CITY OBSERVATORY 1–2
(Feb. 2015), http://cityobservatory.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Surging-City-CenterJobs.pdf; Melanie Eversley, Hard-Knocks Cities Are Working on a Comeback, USA TODAY
(July 24, 2014, 10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/24/citiesvisitors-campaigns/12202367/; Richey Piiparinen, The Rust Bend “Comeback”: To What?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 6:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-rustbelt-comeback-to-what_us_5890e681e4b080b3dad6fc81;
Richard
Voith
&
Susan
Wachter, The Return of America’s Cities: Economic Rebound and the Future of
America’s Urban Centers, PENN INST. FOR URB. RES. (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://penniur.upenn.edu/publications/the-return-of-americas-cities. But see Jacob Anbinder,
Fool for the City: How We’re Over-hyping America’s Urban Comeback, THE
WEEK (Mar. 5, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/542508/fool-city-how-overhyping-americasurban-comeback.
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kinds of communities that will attract what Richard Florida has
called the “creative class.”10 The second is the environmental
movement, which has raised awareness about the ecological effects
of sprawling suburban development, spurring the development of
federal and state environmental initiatives as well as the “smart
growth” movement and the regulatory tools associated with it.11
The third is the regional government movement, which promotes
policies, including growth management, that aim to mute the
importance of local government boundaries and emphasizes the
need for greater coordination among local government within
metropolitan areas—especially with respect to land use planning.12
And the fourth is the growing influence of the new urbanists, a
loosely affiliated group of planners, architects, and lawyers who
promote both urban design practices and regulatory alternatives to
traditional Euclidean zoning practices.13
Not surprisingly, the articulated promises of planning for
density map neatly onto the forces motivating the trend. For urban
leaders, planning for density is a marketing strategy. As one
commentator noted over a decade ago, urban leaders in cities large
and small find themselves “[o]n a hunt for ways to put sex in the
city.”14 They seek to build the kind of communities—urban, mixeduse, and diverse—that they believe will attract elite,
well-educated, hip, young, and affluent residents. The reasoning
behind this ambition traces its roots to Richard Florida’s
enormously influential book, The Rise of the Creative Class.
Florida argues, in this book and others, that the modern economy
is increasingly fueled by “creative” people who are attracted to
“creative centers” that provide “the integrated eco-system or
habitat where all forms of creativity—artistic and cultural,
technological and economic—can take root and flourish.”15 Cities,
10. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT’S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002) [hereinafter
FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS]; RICHARD FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE
CREATIVE CLASS: THE NEW GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR TALENT (2007) [hereinafter FLORIDA,
THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS].
11. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 224 (2004);
DOUGLAS FARR, SUSTAINABLE URBANISM: URBAN DESIGN WITH NATURE (2007).
12. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 2, at 1147–50; ORFIELD, supra note 2, at 123–24;
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 70 (1993).
13. See What is New Urbanism?, supra note 4.
14. John Leland, On a Hunt for Ways to Put Sex in the City, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/garden/on-a-hunt-for-ways-to-put-sex-inthe-city.html.
15. FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10, at 218. Accord
FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10; RICHARD FLORIDA, WHO’S
YOUR CITY?: HOW THE CREATIVE ECONOMY IS MAKING WHERE TO LIVE THE MOST IMPORTANT
DECISION IN YOUR LIFE 116–20 (2008) [hereinafter FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY?].
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Florida argues, “have become the prime location for the creative
lifestyle and the new amenities that go with it.”16 Florida’s
arguments have been sharply criticized,17 and the extent of
America’s urban comeback remains contested.18 But these disputes
have not tempered the enthusiasm of urban leaders for
“densification”—a reality reflected in, among other trends, the
adoption of “new urbanist” land use regulations discussed below.19
Environmentalists focus on the ecological promises of planning
for density.20 They argue that “smart growth” regulations that
channel growth back into urban centers and older suburbs (and
restrict new development on the urban fringe) will help preserve
greenfields and valuable agricultural lands,21 protect wetlands and
other sensitive habitats,22 maintain biodiversity,23 and reduce
greenhouse gases.24
For regional government proponents, planning for density is a
means of addressing the inefficiencies and inequalities that

16. FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, supra note 10, at 287.
17. See, e.g., JOEL KOTKIN, THE HUMAN CITY: URBANISM FOR THE REST OF US (2016)
(questioning the evidence supporting Florida’s conclusions); David Brooks, Where America is
Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/whereamerica-is-working.html?mcubz=3; Ian David Moss, Deconstructing Richard Florida,
CREATEQUITY (Apr. 27, 2009) http://createquity.com/2009/04/deconstructing-richard-florida/.
But cf. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS: HOW OUR CITIES ARE INCREASING
INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE CLASS—AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT (2017) [hereinafter FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS] (recognizing that
the benefits of urbanism are not equally distributed); Max Heninger,
A
New
Urban
Crisis,
REAL
CLEAR
POLICY
(Jan.
4,
2017)
http://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2017/01/04/a_new_urban_crisis_110129.html
(recognizing the competing views of Florida and Kotkin).
18. See, e.g., Anbinder, supra note 9.
19. See infra notes 44–45 and text accompanying notes.
20. See generally David Dodman, Urban Form, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Climate Vulnerability, in POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 64–79 (José
Miguel Guzmán et al. eds., 2009), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resourcepdf/pop_dynamics_climate_change_0.pdf; Michael P. Johnson, Environmental Impacts of
Urban Sprawl: A Survey of the Literature and Proposed Research Agenda, 33 ENV’T & PLAN.
A 717 (2001); APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, supra note 1; Sprawl Overview, SIERRA
CLUB, http://vault.sierraclub.org/sprawl/overview/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
21. See, e.g., APA Policy Guide on Agricultural Land Preservation, AM. PLAN. ASS’N,
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/agricultural.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
22. See, e.g., William E. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism and the Problem of
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 74–75 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145,
169–75 (2002); Study Shows Urban Sprawl Threatens Genetic Diversity, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 2010, 6:00 AM, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sduturbanization-threatens-genetic-diversity-species-2010sep22-story.html.
24. See, e.g., Christopher Jones & Daniel M. Kammen, Spatial Distribution of U.S.
Carbon Footprints Reveals Suburbanization Undermines Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Urban
Population Density, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 895 (2014) (finding that dense urban centers
contribute less greenhouse-gas emissions per person than other areas of the country, but
these cities’ extensive suburbs wipe out their climate benefits).

6

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 33:1

pervade our metropolitan areas.25 Proponents of regional
government assume that suburbs are places of exit.26 According to
this account, suburbanites abandoned cities (often motivated by
racism);27 municipal incorporation laws shield suburbs from
annexation;28 exclusionary suburban land use policies prevent the
exit of poor urban residents;29 and exiters saddle urban
governments with the burden of addressing (but not the resources
to address) the myriad woes of poverty.30 The never-ending
cycle of new suburban development also necessitates
wasteful development of new infrastructure (while older, urban
infrastructure decays or lies fallow), reduces the opportunities for
interlocal cooperation, and prevents local governments from
capitalizing on economies of scale.31
Regionalists argue that suburbanites remain, in important
respects, part of the urban polity, reasoning that the suburbs
where they live are intertwined socially and economically with the
center cities.32 According to this view, suburbanites are essentially
economic “leeches” that reap the benefits of cities without
contributing in any meaningful way to supporting them.33 For
regionalists, economic and social justice mandate planning for
density, especially through regional growth management tools that
25. See supra note 2.
26. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 277 (2007).
27. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 256 (1993)
(“[M]illions of people have escaped city problems by crossing the boundary between city and
suburb . . . segregat[ing] many of America’s metropolitan areas into ‘two nations’: rich and
poor, white and black, expanding and contracting.”); Cashin, supra note 2, at 2015
(“[F]ragmented political borders were . . . the result of economic, social, and racial
differentiation—a locational sorting process . . . .”).
28. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1141–44.
29. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES 42–60 (2009); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1047, 1048 (1996).
30. See ORFIELD, supra note 2, at 2 (“Throughout the United States, people move ‘up
and out,’ taking their economic and social resources with them and leaving behind an
increasingly dense core of poverty in the city and rapidly growing social needs in older
suburbs.”).
31. See PEIRCE, supra note 2, at 97–99; Briffault, supra note 2, at 1147–50; Clayton P.
Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 204–06 (2001).
32. The continued importance of center cities is supported by substantial evidence
linking overall regional health with center-city fortunes, see RUSK, supra note 12, at 72–73,
and suggests that commuters to city jobs tend to have higher wages than suburban
employees, Gillette, supra note 31, at 241–42.
33. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 443 (1990) (asserting that suburbanites routinely deny that “[t]he city
was the primary center of jobs and commercial and cultural institutions for the region”);
Gillette, supra note 31, at 241 (“[S]uburbanites exploit the central city by taking advantage
of the cultural and commercial benefits . . . but then retreat without contributing to the
services necessary to provide those benefits and without redressing the social problems
endemic to cities.”).
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direct new development back into built-up areas. Encouraging (or
requiring) urban redevelopment is embraced as a way to right the
wrongs wrought by our fragmented system of local government,
build more inclusive and just communities, and improve the
educational and economic prospects of the urban poor.34
And then there are the new urbanists. I want to spend just a
bit more time on them, both because they are not well-known
outside of land use circles and because their growing influence on
land use regulation is underappreciated. The new urbanism is also
central to the paradox of planning for density. The new urbanists
are a loosely affiliated group of architects and urban planning
professionals who promote the development of—and the adoption
of legal rules that mandate the development of—mixed-land-use
“urban” neighborhoods.35 The new urbanists’ claim builds, in
important ways, upon Jane Jacobs's enormously influential book,
The Death and Life of Great American Cities.36 Jacobs wrote at the
apex of the urban renewal period, when urban planning ideology
strongly favored the imposition of single-land-use patterns on our
cities, even to the point of demolishing mixed-land-use
communities in order to replace them with single-land-use ones.
She vehemently rejected the accepted wisdom that dense urban
neighborhoods were antiquated and unhealthy.37 On the contrary,
she argued that mixed-land-use neighborhoods are critical to city
life, because commercial land uses both generate social capital and
guarantee a steady supply of “eyes upon the street” to monitor and
keep disorder and crime in check.38
The new urbanists embrace many of the environmentalists’
and regionalists’ arguments, but they argue that planning for
density has cultural and aesthetic benefits as well. Their case
against Euclidean zoning is part anti-suburban polemic and part
pro-urban philosophy. At heart, the new urbanists’ claim is that
cities are good for us, and suburbs are bad.39 They are bad for two
34. See Frug, supra note 27, at 279–81, 294–99.
35. See Charter of the New Urbanism, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM (2001),
https://www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism (stating the principles of the new
urbanism); What is CNU?, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/who-weare (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (same); see also GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 149–54 (1999) (describing the principles of the new
urbanism).
36. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(1961).
37. Id. at 3–25.
38. Id. at 34–38.
39. See, e.g., LÉON KRIER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY 104 (Dhiru A. Thadani
& Peter J. Hetzel eds. 2009) (“Functional zoning replaces the organic order of the city with
the mechanical disorder of the suburbs . . . .”).
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reasons. First, the new urbanists believe that suburbs are ugly.
Indeed, they think just about everything built since the Second
World War that was not designed by new urbanists is ugly.40
Second, they believe that urban neighborhoods build community.
Cities, they argue, are as socializing and democratizing as suburbs
are privatizing. Cities are diverse and vibrant, suburbs monolithic
and isolating. To put the claim into social-science terminology, the
new urbanists argue that cities generate social capital by drawing
together strangers who would not otherwise connect, while
suburbs inhibit social capital by further privatizing our alreadyatomized culture.41 Thus, it follows that zoning laws that mandate
a single-land-use, “suburban” built environment are antisocial and
ought to be scrapped.42 The normative claims of new urbanists are
colorfully summarized by James Howard Kunstler as follows:
“[T]he model of the human habitat dictated by zoning is a formless,
soulless, centerless, demoralizing mess. It bankrupts families and
townships. It causes mental illness. It disables whole classes of
decent, normal citizens. It ruins the air we breathe. It corrupts and
deadens our spirits.”43
Kunstler makes clear that the normative and aesthetic claims
of the new urbanists are intertwined. New urbanists believe that
architectural design can cure the social, as well as the aesthetic,
woes of our culture. Traditional architecture, they argue, is
friendly and welcoming; suburban architecture is cold and
privatizing. They love front porches and hate garage doors. This is
important because, over the last few decades, the new urbanists
have mounted a remarkably successful public relations campaign
against traditional zoning practices and the suburban land use
patterns resulting from them. They also have developed an
40. JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 10 (1993) [hereinafter KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
NOWHERE] (“Eighty percent of everything ever built in America has been built in the last
fifty years, and most of it is depressing, brutal, ugly, unhealthy and spiritually
degrading . . . .”).
41. By social capital, I refer here to Robert Putnam’s “lean and mean” definition:
“[S]ocial networks and the norms of reciprocity . . . that arise from them.” ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
Specifically, the new urbanists claim, to borrow from Putnam, that nonresidential land uses
are “bridging” institutions—that is, they draw together groups of individuals who might not
otherwise interact. Id. at 22–24. For a thoughtful discussion of the new urbanism and social
capital, see Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban
Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 559–61 (2006).
42. JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY
WORLD FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134–35 (1996) [hereinafter KUNSTLER, HOME FROM
NOWHERE] (“The public consensus about how to build a human settlement . . . has collapsed.
Standards of excellence in architecture and town planning have collapsed. . . . What was
thrown away must now be reconstructed, spelled out, and reinstated.”).
43. Id. at 112.
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alternative to zoning laws—“transect zoning”—that seeks to
impose these aesthetic sensibilities through the law, which local
governments increasingly are embracing.44 The reach of these
regulations varies by jurisdiction,45 with a growing number of
local governments, including several major cities, choosing to
implement them comprehensively on a city-wide basis.46
III. THE PERILS OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY
The perils of planning for density are well-understood, if
contested, and are primarily associated with the coercive (rather
than the voluntary) regulatory practices in the planning-fordensity toolkit—especially regulations that promote urban density
by restricting suburban growth. The economics of growth
management are fairly straightforward. Despite their best efforts,
land use planners inevitably confront the law of supply and
demand. Both economic theory and empirical research suggest
that regulatory limits on new development drive up property
values and reduce housing affordability.47 Michael Schill succinctly
summarized the problem as follows: “The Achilles’ heel of the
‘smart growth’ movement is the impact that many of the proposals
put forth by its advocates would have on affordable housing.”48
According to proponents, properly structured, metropolitan- or
state-wide limits on suburban development are necessary to
44. See Tools, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/resources/tools
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018); CHAD EMERSON & ANDRES DUANY, THE SMARTCODE SOLUTION TO
SPRAWL (2007).
45. See Nate Berg, Brave New Codes, ARCHITECT MAG., July 2010, at 50, 51–53,
http://cdn.coverstand.com/11050/41861/41861.2.pdf.
46. The cities of Miami, Denver, and Cincinnati have overhauled their existing zoning
codes in favor of transect-zoning regulations. See, e.g., Dakota Handon & Alex Adams,
Miami 21: The Blueprint for Miami’s Future, FLA. PLAN. 4 (Winter 2010),
http://www.fltod.com/research/tod_planning_and_fbc_in_florida/miami_21/miami_21_florida
_planning.pdf; CITY OF MIAMI PLAN. AND ZONING DEP’T, MIAMI21: YOUR CITY, YOUR PLAN,
www.miami21.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); Christopher N. Osher, Denver Council Passes
Overhaul of City’s Zoning Laws, DENVER POST (June 21, 2010, 4:03 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2010/06/21/denver-council-passes-overhaul-of-citys-zoning-laws/;
How Does the Denver Zoning Code Work?, DENVER DEP’T OF COMMUNITY PLAN. AND DEV.,
https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/community-planning-anddevelopment/zoning/neighborhood-context.html
(last
visited
Jan.
1,
2018);
John Yung, Here’s How Cincinnati’s Form-Based Codes are Designed to
Spur
Redevelopment,
CINN.
BUS.
COURIER
(Jan.
14,
2014,
9:45
AM)
http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2014/01/21/heres-how-cincinnatis-formbased.html.
47. See, e.g., Shen, infra note 54, at 70 (reviewing empirical studies analyzing the
price effects of growth controls).
48. Michael H. Schill, Comment, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 102, 102 (Anthony Downs
ed., 2004).
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achieve urban density because local government power leads
inevitably to a tragedy of the commons scenario within a
metropolitan area.49 Each suburban government jealously guards
its authority to regulate land use so as to maximize local tax
revenues (and resident satisfaction).50 More affluent “inner-ring”
suburbs tend to accomplish these goals through exclusionary
zoning techniques that freeze out new development, pushing it to
the suburban fringe.51 Communities located on that fringe,
recognizing their competitive advantage, have incentives to
encourage development by relaxing land use standards.52
Increased sprawl results inevitably from this pattern of exclusion
and invitation.53 When growth controls are imposed locally,
therefore, they tend to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, sprawl
by shifting development to non-controlled areas.54 As William
Fischel has observed, local growth controls “probably cause
metropolitan areas to be to spread out . . . [by] caus[ing] developers
to go to other communities.”55
For this reason, growth-management and regional government
proponents alike tend to favor controls imposed at the state or
regional level, such as the urban growth boundaries imposed in
Oregon. Proponents argue that regional growth controls can
counter the inefficiencies described above by channeling new
development back into declining center cities and saving
undeveloped land from “cheating” suburbs with lax land use

49. See, e.g., ARTHUR C. NELSON & JAMES B. DUNCAN WITH CLANCY J. MULLEN & KIRK
R. BISHOP, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 19 (1993) (“Regional
approaches to planning and growth management issues have long been championed as a
necessary alternative to the problems associated with fragmented, uncoordinated, and
competitive local government policies.”).
50. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 33, at 349 (noting that “local government law does
not distinguish within the category of municipal corporation between city and suburb”); id.
at 366 (linking suburban autonomy and local land use regulation); Briffault, supra note 2, at
1134–35.
51. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1135–36 (noting that affluent communities use
exclusionary zoning to preserve high tax base); Frug, supra note 29, at 1083–84 (describing
use of exclusionary zoning).
52. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1135 (attributing “‘leapfrog’ pattern of development”
to exclusionary zoning in central suburbs that forces new development to outer-ring suburbs
with more favorable political climates); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, DO GROWTH CONTROLS
MATTER? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 55 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Linda Kirts Davis, Saving the Land: The Utilization
of Modern Techniques of Growth Management to Preserve Rural and Agricultural America,
13 URB. L. 27, 30–31 (1981).
54. See, e.g., Q Shen, Spatial Impacts of Locally Enacted Growth Controls: The San
Francisco Bay Region in the 1980s, 23 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 61, 86 (1996).
55. FISCHEL, supra note 52, at 55.
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regulations.56 Unfortunately, centralized growth management
policies likely exacerbate their price effects. One benefit of the
traditional pattern of exclusion and invitation described above is
that new growth on the suburban fringe tends to mitigate the price
effects of growth controls in inner suburbs.57 Sprawl, in turn,
promotes the housing filtering process, by which a wealthier
individual moving to a larger house sets off a “chain of successive
housing moves” that increases the availability of quality housing
for poor and moderate-income individuals.58 We might therefore
expect comprehensive growth management, more than local
controls, to increase overall regional housing prices.59
Regional government proponents counter that centralized
control over development policy can actually increase the
affordability of housing overall,60 by curtailing local governments’
exclusionary tendencies.61 This is because regional growth policies
not only limit exclusionary zoning, but also often incorporate
planning tools (such as housing linkage, inclusionary zoning,
density bonuses, and impact-fee waivers) designed to increase the
supply of affordable housing.62 Perhaps. But even assuming that
policymakers muster the political will to implement
affordability-promotion tools on a large enough scale to counter the
56. See, e.g., id. at 30 (arguing that growth controls would “benefit central city
dwellers through rehabilitation and revitalization of the central city” and “would be
environmentally beneficial by preserving agricultural land and open space”); William B.
Shore, Recentralization: The Single Answer to More Than a Dozen Unites States Problems
and a Major Answer to Poverty, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 496 (1995).
57. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs? 116 YALE L.J. 598,
605–609 (2006) (reviewing literature).
58. Brian J.L. Berry, Ghetto Expansion and Single-Family Housing Prices: Chicago,
1968–1972, 3 J. URB. ECON. 397, 417 (1976) (arguing that suburbanization led to a massive
chain of moves, which mitigated the price effects of racial discrimination in Chicago and
enabled many families to improve their housing situation).
59. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509–28 (1991) (arguing that
competition between municipalities may reduce their ability to exact concessions from
developers); Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link between Growth Management and Housing
Affordability: The Academic Evidence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE
HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 127–28 (predicting that regional growth management
policies will have greater price effects than will local ones, which permit housing consumers
to migrate to uncontrolled jurisdictions).
60. See, e.g., GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE:
LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 52–58 (1992) (discussing conflicting
evidence on the price effects of Oregon’s comprehensive growth management program).
61. Metropolitan fragmentation undoubtedly permits local governments to dress up
exclusionary zoning in a growth-management gown. After all, limits on all new development
serve the double purpose of excluding disfavored land uses (and questionable new
neighbors) and making existing homes a scarcer, and therefore more valuable, resource. See,
e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES.
139, 146 (2005) (discussing literature).
62. Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT?, 86–100.
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regressive effects of growth management—a big “if,” in my
opinion—the transitional fairness questions raised by suburban
growth restrictions remain. These concerns are not limited to
housing affordability. Even if a regional development strategy
succeeded in holding constant the overall cost of housing, most
affordable housing would likely continue to be found in center
cities and older suburbs.63 After all, regional growth-management
strategies aim to channel new development into built-up areas.
Yet, as Robert Bruegmann highlights in his excellent history of
suburban sprawl, urban life has always been most difficult for the
poor, and suburbs have long represented the urban poor’s hope for
a better life.64 The reality is that suburbs offer the good schools,
economic opportunities, and environmental amenities that wealthy
urban dwellers can afford to purchase and poorer ones
cannot65—realities that Richard Florida himself acknowledges in a
recent book.66
Moreover, and in my view more importantly, there is
something slightly unseemly about dramatically curtailing
suburban growth at a time when racial minorities are responsible
for the lion’s share of suburban population gains in many major
metropolitan areas.67 A majority of Asian Americans, half of
Hispanic Americans, and nearly forty percent of African
Americans are now suburbanites.68 Efforts to channel development
into the urban core could slow or reverse this trend, which is
fueling increased suburban racial diversity. This risk is especially
pronounced because many of the most diverse neighborhoods have
characteristics that draw the ire of sprawl opponents: they are
located in low-density metropolitan areas in the West and
Southwest and filled with relatively low cost “starter homes.”69 It
is difficult to avoid concluding that changing the rules of the
development game at this time is tantamount to pulling the
suburban ladder out from under those late exiters who
63. See Schill, supra note 48, at 104.
64. See ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 26–29 (2005).
65. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2102–08 (2002) (discussing the connection between economic status and
educational achievement); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner-City Poor, 67 CHI.KENT L. REV. 795, 811–31 (1991) (advocating policies that help the urban poor move to
suburbs).
66. See FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS, supra note 17.
67. WILLIAM H. FREY, Melting Pot Suburbs: A Study of Suburban Diversity, in 1
REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 155, 163
(Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003).
68. Id. at 167–74.
69. See Been, supra note 61, at 164 (“[N]ew neighborhoods of starter homes are more
racially mixed than established neighborhoods.” (citation omitted)).
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previously
were
excluded
from
suburban
life
by
economic circumstance, exclusionary zoning, and—in some
cases—intentional discrimination. Moreover, the primary
advantages of growth management imposed in the name of
planning for density may be enjoyed by individuals who have
perpetrated, or at least benefited from, this past exclusion: that is,
the current suburban homeowners who are the immediate
beneficiaries of the economic and environmental amenities that
attend growth controls.70
The new urbanists promise that their regulatory alternative to
Euclidean zoning promotes density while avoiding or mitigating
the economic perils of growth controls by “simplifying” land use
regulation.71 New urbanists argue that cities should reject
use-based zoning regulations in favor of a system of form-based
aesthetic controls that governs the appropriate form of buildings in
a given neighborhood.72 Their regulatory alternative to zoning
finds its roots in architect Andrés Duany’s 2003 SmartCode. New
urbanist codes flow from the assumption that urban development
proceeds naturally from more-dense areas to less-dense ones.73
Duany calls this progression the “transect” and urges cities to
replace traditional use zoning with regulations on building form
appropriate to the various “transect zones” along the progression.74
Most cities’ transect-zoning schemes, by and large, have adopted
this formula (depicted in Figure 1 below), which assumes a natural
progression of urban development from more to less dense.75

70. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 400 (1977) (“Antigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries:
those who already own residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding.”).
Although the evidence is mixed, some studies show a correlation between levels of home
ownership and support for growth controls. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN
PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA 95 (1986) (finding strong
correlation between home ownership and support for limiting apartment construction); Alan
Gin & Jonathan Sandy, Evaluating the Demand for Residential Growth Controls, 3 J.
HOUSING ECON. 109 (1994) (support for growth controls increases with rates of home
ownership). But see Mark Baldassare & Georjeanna Wilson, Changing Sources of Suburban
Support for Local Growth Controls, 33 URB. STUD. 459, 462 (1996) (evidence on correlation
mixed).
71. See DANIEL G. PAROLEK ET AL., FORM-BASED CODES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS,
URBAN DESIGNERS, MUNICIPALITIES, AND DEVELOPERS 4, 39 (2008) (arguing that new
urbanist codes ought to be “simple” and short).
72. Id. at 12 (describing form-based codes as a method to regulate new-urbanist-style
development by controlling physical form rather than land use).
73. See ANDRÉS DUANY ET AL., SMARTCODE: VERSION 9.2, at vi–vii (2012).
74. Id. at xi; Andrés Duany & Emily Talen, Transect Planning, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
245, 245–48 (2002).
75. The Transect, CTR. FOR APPLIED TRANSECT STUD., http://transect.org/transect.html
(last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (“Before the automobile, American development patterns were
walkable, and transects within towns and city neighborhoods revealed areas that were less
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Figure 1. The Urban Transect76

Drawing upon this concept, proponents of transect zoning urge
regulators to scrap traditional zoning codes, which regulate based
upon property uses, in favor of a regulatory system that targets
building density and form.77 Proponents of transect zoning argue
that the codes defining the appropriate building forms along the
transect—known in the vernacular as “form-based codes”—ought
to be “simple” and short.78 Unfortunately, while new urbanists
echo Jacobs’ embrace of urban land use patterns, their preferred
method for achieving them departs from her relatively libertarian
belief that cities thrive best when government leaves them alone.79
As implemented, neither the new urbanism nor the new urbanists’
regulatory alternative to zoning is a libertarian project. On the
contrary, to borrow from Vicki Been and Bob Ellickson’s
description of building codes, form-based codes can be “technical
document[s], whose level of difficulty at places may rival that of
the Internal Revenue Code.”80 New urbanists have specific ideas
about how buildings should look: they should not only be
architecturally appropriate, but also attractive, indeed welcoming,
in their details.81 Many form-based codes favor “traditional”
urban and more urban in character. This urbanism could be analyzed as natural transects
are analyzed.”).
76. Id.
77. PAROLEK ET AL., supra note 71, at 18–19.
78. Id. at 39.
79. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 73, at iv (“[The SmartCode] is meant to be
law . . . administered by municipal planning departments and interpreted by elected
representatives of local government.”); Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED CODES
INST., https://formbasedcodes.org/definition/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (“[F]orm-based codes
are regulatory, not advisory.”).
80. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 447 (3d ed. 2005).
81. See generally KRIER, supra note 39 (discussing architecture and urbanism).
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building designs—that is, those reminiscent of the pre-zoning
communities that new urbanists champion as a planning ideal.
And, while most new urbanists argue that form-based codes are
distinct from architectural regulations, in practice, many formbased codes mandate architectural design elements.82
There are both practical and theoretical reasons why
architectural details pervade transect-zoning regulations.
Practically, determining which building “forms” belong in a given
transect zone is not a self-evident proposition, but rather, must be
spelled out in architectural codes, such as the one reproduced
above in Figure 1.83 Moreover, detailed architectural restrictions
may placate groups that are resistant to regulatory changes
enabling density and a mixing of land uses—particularly,
homeowners concerned about protecting their property values from
externalities that nonresidential land uses may generate.84
Theoretically, many new urbanists believe that our society’s idea of
what constitutes “good” urban environments has been corrupted by
decades of zoning. Therefore, they believe that pervasive and
comprehensive government regulation is required in order to
mandate those environments. As James Howard Kunstler argues,
“The[se] codes will invoke in words and graphic images standards
of excellence that previously existed in the minds of ordinary
citizens but which have been forgotten and forsaken. The codes,
therefore, aim to restore the collective cultural consciousness.”85
Not surprisingly, therefore, form-based codes frequently impose
high compliance costs. These costs flow in large part from the
imposition of architectural standards, which, at a minimum,
require securing the services of an architect to ensure compliance,
but may also require expensive building materials.86 This extra
82. See Berg, supra note 45, at 51–53.
83. See Elizabeth Garvin & Dawn Jourdan, Through the Looking Glass: Analyzing the
Potential Legal Challenges to Form-Based Codes, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 404–06
(2008); Kenny Be, Everybody Must Get Zoned: Kenny Be Looks at Denver’s New Zoning
Rules, WESTWORD (Jan. 20, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/everybodymust-get-zoned-kenny-be-looks-at-denvers-new-zoning-rules-5879939#page-1 (“[A]t 730
pages, not including 76 neighborhood maps and six Overlay District maps, the new zoning
code is being called an improvement. It is a control-freak fantasy, with detailed rules for
every aspect of city life.”).
84. GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY, supra note 3, at 200–201.
85. KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE, supra note 42 at 135.
86. See Ajay Garde, Designing and Developing New Urbanist Projects in the United
States: Insights and Implications, 11 J. OF URB. DESIGN 33, 43–44 (2006) (noting that
architectural features, materials and highly detailed design codes are cost burdens
associated with new urbanism); Yan Song & Mark Stevens, The Economics of New
Urbanism and Smart Growth: Comparing Price Gains and Costs Between New Urbanists
and Conventional Developments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF URBAN ECONOMICS AND
PLANNING 503, 513–19 (Nancy Brooks et al. eds., 2012).
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layer of difficulty supplements pre-existing regulations of “building
form,” including building codes and the accessibility regulations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).87 Moreover, the
public-choice realities discussed above often require that
form-based codes supplement, rather than supplant, pre-existing
zoning regulations and growth controls.88 Essentially, these codes
are the equivalent of a highly technical performance-zoning
overlay.89 Not only are new urbanist developments more expensive
than conventional ones,90 but compliance costs have stalled some
redevelopment efforts governed by form-based zoning.91 In other
87. See, e.g., CNTY. OF SANTA BARBARA PLANNING & DEV. DEP’T, LOS ALAMOS BELL
STREET DESIGN GUIDELINES 24 (2011) (mandating that ramps and guiderails should
complement the overall design intent while conforming with existing building code and ADA
requirements). For a discussion of general building costs associated with ADA compliance,
see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 80, at 452.
88. See Kaizer Rangwala, Hybrid Codes Versus Form-Based Codes, NEW URB. NEWS,
Apr.–May 2009, at 12, 13 (noting that, despite plans for city-wide form-based codes, limited
resources, development, and political pressures forced officials to adopt hybrid codes or
overlay districts in Phoenix and Ventura); see also DONALD L. ELLIOTT, A BETTER WAY TO
ZONE: TEN PRINCIPLES TO CREATE MORE LIVABLE CITIES 37–38 (2008) (asserting that formbased codes are likely to supplement rather than replace conventional zoning because of
lack of time, money, and political support); John M. Barry, Form Based Codes: Measured
Success Through Both Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 331
(2008) (offering parallel form-based codes that supplement conventional zoning as a solution
when there is public opposition to mandatory form-based codes).
89. Performance zoning regulates land use by establishing parameters designed to
limit the negative impact of the use. Although performance zoning is more flexible than
conventional zoning, it is often difficult to administer and no major city has replaced
Euclidean zoning in favor of performance zoning. See ELLIOTT, supra note 88, at 23–26;
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 101–02 (2d ed. 2007). For an example of a highly detailed
form-based overlay, see Jeremy E. Sharp, An Examination of the Form-Based
Code and Its Application to the Town of Blacksburg 20–21 (Nov. 4, 2004)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University),
https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/37154/SharpFINALmajorpaper.pdf?se
quence=1&isAllowed=y (noting that South Miami’s highly detailed form-based overlay
regulates the uses on each floor of buildings in the urban zone).
90. See, e.g., Joseph E. Gyourko & Witold Rybczynski, Financing New Urbanism
Projects: Obstacles and Solutions, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 733, 739–40 (2000)
(concluding, based on an extensive survey of builders and developers, that new urbanist
projects are more expensive); Philip Langdon, The Not-So-Secret Code: Across the U.S.,
Form-Based Codes Are Putting New Urbanist Ideas into Practice, AM. PLAN. ASS’N
(Jan. 2006) (asserting that the cost of form-based codes “exceeds that of a conventional landuse plan” making citywide form-based coding “prohibitively expensive”).
91. See GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY, supra note 3, at 176–180; Ed Tombari, The
Future of Zoning?, 22 LAND DEV. 23, 25 (2009) (noting development drawbacks to Arlington,
Virginia’s form-based overlay that include having to go back to the Planning Board in order
to make minor facade changes); Mark Simpson, Cost and Business Resistance Kill Orlando
Suburb Beautification and Traffic Calming Effort, WNYC: TRANS. NATION (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/285835-cost-and-business-resistance-kill-orlando-suburbbeautification-and-traffic-calming-effort/ (noting the cost of a form-based redevelopment
project as a reason for its rejection); Robert Steuteville, Survey: Combine New Code with
Activities and Investment, CONGRESS FOR THE NEW URBANISM: PUB. SQUARE (Apr. 1, 2010),
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/survey-combine-new-code-activities-and-investment
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words, new urbanist regulation may exacerbate, rather than
mitigate, the economic effects of achieving urban density through
growth management.
IV. THE PARADOX OF PLANNING FOR DENSITY
I come at last to the paradox of planning for density, a paradox
that flows from the particular claims of the new urbanists. As
discussed previously, the new urbanists argue that planning
for density—or, at least their version of it, which
focuses on encouraging and/or mandating mixed-land-use
developments—holds promises beyond the economic, ecological,
and distributional. Specifically, building upon Jane Jacobs’ claims
about the communitarian benefits of the urban form, the new
urbanists argue that planning for density will foster the social
capital necessary to build thriving communities.
The paradox of planning for density can be summarized in four
words: “Was Jane Jacobs wrong?” Recall that Jane Jacobs argued
that dense, mixed-land-use urban neighborhoods were safer and
more socially cohesive than less populated, single-use ones.92
These claims, which have been embraced with great gusto by the
new urbanists, flowed from two convictions/predictions about the
effects of density, especially of commercial land uses, on city life.
First, she argued that mixed-land-use neighborhoods are safer
than single-land-use ones.93 She intuited that, by drawing people
into city streets, businesses generate “eyes upon the street” that
keep disorder and crime in check.94 Indeed, she went so far as to
argue that neighborhood bars could contribute to neighborhood
security, reasoning that their patrons would serve a private
surveillance function well into the night hours.95 Second, Jacobs
argued that commercial land uses help build community by
bringing together people who would not otherwise meet. Jacobs
reasoned, “The trust of a city street is formed over time from
many, many little public sidewalk contacts. It grows out of people
stopping by at the bar for a beer, getting advice from the grocer
and giving advice to the newsstand man . . . .”96 Drawing from
Jacobs, the new urbanists assert that the single-land-use design of
(noting that only twenty-nine percent of the communities that adopted form-based codes
during or after 2007 have had projects built).
92. See JACOBS, supra note 36, at 3–25.
93. Id. at 36–37.
94. Id. at 34–35 (“A well-used city street is apt to be a safe street. A deserted city
street is apt to be unsafe.”).
95. Id. at 40–41.
96. Id. at 56.
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suburbia deprives many Americans of the opportunity to build
community and relationships with one another.97 Philip Langdon,
for example, echoes Jacobs when he argues, “[T]he tavern, the cafe,
the coffee shop, the neighborhood store . . . have been zoned out of
residential areas . . . . As informal gathering places have been
banished, many opportunities for making friendships and pursuing
common interests have disappeared.”98
Unfortunately, Jacobs’ arguments appear to be intuitively
appealing but empirically unsustainable. The popular and
academic commentary on Jacobs’ arguments almost entirely
neglects to take into account the empirical literature testing and
rejecting her hypotheses. These studies find instead that
commercial land uses increase crime and disorder and suppress
social capital.99 In a number of studies criminologists, sociologists,
and environmental psychologists have examined the connection
between land use patterns and disorder, crime, and “collective
efficacy,” which sociologists and social psychologists define as the
“ability of neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents
and maintain effective social control.”100 These studies test Jacobs’
claims by comparing the levels of crime, disorder, and social
cohesion in exclusively residential and mixed-land-use
neighborhoods.101 These studies generally find that exclusively
97. ANDRES DUANY, ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBECK & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION:
THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 59–64 (2010) (“Americans
are splintering into insular factions, each pursuing an increasingly narrow agenda, with
nary a thought for the greater good. Further, more and more citizens seem to be
withdrawing from public life into the shelter of their private homes . . . . [I]t is nearimpossible to imagine community independent of the town square or the local pub . . . .
[P]edestrian life cannot exist in the absence of worthwhile destinations that are easily
accessible on foot. This is a condition that modern suburbia fails to satisfy, since it strives to
keep all commercial activity well separated from housing.”).
98. PHILIP LANGDON, A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE: RESHAPING THE AMERICAN SUBURB
15–16 (1994).
99. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J.
SOC. 603, 624 (1999) (“Neighborhoods with mixed residential and commercial development
exhibit higher levels of both physical and social disorder, regardless of sociodemographic
characteristics.”).
100. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1604
(2002). For a fuller discussion on collective efficacy and neighborhood health, see Sampson
& Raudenbush, supra note 99. See also Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent
Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCI., Aug. 15, 1997, at 918.
101. Some of these studies focus on so-called land use “hot spots”—that is, particular
land uses associated with high levels of crime and disorder. It is fair to say that the
empirical literature on land use “hot spots” does not bear out Jacobs’s hunch about taverns,
as there is ample evidence that bars increase crime and disorder and suppress informal
social controls within a neighborhood. See, e.g., Dennis W. Roncek & Mitchell A. Pravatiner,
Additional Evidence that Taverns Enhance Nearby Crime, SOC. & SOC. RES., July 1989, 185;
Dennis W. Roncek & Pamela A. Maier, Bars, Blocks and Crimes Revisited: Linking the
Theory of Routine Activities to the Empiricism of “Hot Spots”, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 725 (1991).
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residential neighborhoods have lower crime rates, less disorder,
and more collective efficacy than mixed residential and commercial
neighborhoods.102
Researchers conducting these studies link their findings to the
“routine activities” theory of crime.103 Routine activities theory
builds on the insight that most predatory crime is opportunistic.
As Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush summarize,
“predatory crime involves the intersection in time and space of
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable
guardians.”104 Land use patterns are relevant to this thesis for two
reasons. First, non-residential land uses (for example schools,
stores, parks, etc.) may serve to invite would-be offenders into a
neighborhood. Moreover, by providing places where individuals
congregate, commercial land uses generate a larger pool of
potential victims than residential ones. In other words, while
Jacobs may have been right that commercial land uses increase
the number of individuals present in an urban neighborhood, the
routine activities theory suggests that higher numbers of “eyes
upon the street” may increase the number of potential offenders,
as well as the number of law-abiding crime monitors.
Second, contrary to Jacobs’s intuition, commercial land uses
decrease incentives for private surveillance efforts. Jacobs argued
that outsiders as well as insiders to a community provide the “eyes
upon the street” needed to suppress disorder and crime.105
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence suggests that the opposite is
true. Strangers “invited” to a community by commercial land uses
apparently act to decrease, rather than increase, the level of
informal surveillance in a neighborhood. They also appear to
reduce neighborhood social cohesion.106 Resident surveys
conducted for the land use studies discussed above, however,
suggest that commercial land uses reduce informal monitoring,
because they reduce the sense in which residents consider it their
“own;” perhaps, because commercial land uses generate foot traffic
that makes it difficult for residents to discern between insiders
and outsiders in a community.107 In one study, for example,
102. See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor et al., Street Blocks with More Nonresidential Land Uses
Have More Physical Deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia, 31 URB. AFF.
REV. 120 (1995).
103. Jeffrey D. Morenoff, et al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the
Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 521 (2001).
104. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 99, at 610.
105. JACOBS, supra note 36, at 35.
106. See Taylor et al., supra note 102.
107. See Pamela Wilcox et al., Busy Places and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the
Role of Physical Structure and Process in Community Crime Models, 45 SOC. Q. 185, 188–90,
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“[r]esidents on blocks with more nonresidential land
use . . . recognized other on-block residents less well, felt that they
had less control over events in the neighborhood, and were less
likely to count on a neighbor to watch out for suspicious activity,”
than residents of exclusively residential blocks.108
Since most of my early scholarship might have been described
as “Jane Jacobs on steroids,” these findings were initially
devastating to me. I pondered them for years before I came to the
conclusion that intellectual honestly demanded that I build a case
for planning for density, rather than build a case for
mixed-land-use planning, that tackles the uncomfortable reality
that these empirical studies present. My case is built upon an
apparent paradox, which I call the “People Paradox.” The People
Paradox can be summarized as follows: In urban neighborhoods,
people may not make us safer, but for a variety of reasons, they
apparently make us feel safer. The empirical evidence suggests
that, although we are not safer in busy places, we think that we
are. That is, we feel safer in busy places. At least in urban
neighborhoods, that is, we are afraid of being alone. We believe
that there is safety in numbers. For a variety of reasons that I
explore in detail in other work, we associate “aloneness” with
vulnerability to crime.109 As Mark Warr, the author of one of the
most systematic studies linking the fear of crime to the fear of
being alone, has observed, “being alone in a truly dangerous
environment is the stuff of nightmares.”110
This People Paradox suggests that, even if the new urbanists’
project rests on a flawed intuition about the benefits of mixedland-use communities, we need not abandon efforts to plan for
density. This is because fear of crime is at least as important a
contributor to residential stability as crime itself—the two
phenomena being related but distinct. Safety—reflected
both in actual crime rates and the perceived risk of
victimization—strongly influences residential location decisions. In
his 1956 essay, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Charles
Tiebout influentially hypothesized that municipalities compete for
residents by offering different packages of public policies and

200 (2004); Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: A Comparison of
Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime
Neighborhoods, 5 POPULATION & ENV’T 141, 162 (1982); Taylor et al., supra note 102, at 121.
108. Ellen M. Kurtz et al., Land Use, Physical Deterioration, Resident-Based Control,
and Calls for Service on Urban Streetblocks, 15 JUST. Q. 121, 135 (1998).
109. See The People Paradox, supra note 7, 71–75 (2012) (reviewing literature).
110. Mark Warr, Dangerous Situations: Social Context and the Fear of Victimization,
68 SOC. FORCES 891, 895 (1990).
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public goods.111 According to the Tiebout model, residents sort
themselves within a metropolitan area according to their
preferences for public goods and municipal services.112 The benefit
of this sorting is that it drives efficiency by subjecting local
governments to market competition.113
Although Tiebout did not mention it specifically, safety
undoubtedly is one of the public goods influencing residential
sorting. The Tieboutian case for safe city neighborhoods is not
merely a theoretical one. In one nationwide study, Julie Berry
Cullen and Steven Levitt found a strong correlation between crime
and urban flight. Each reported city crime correlated with a oneperson decline in city population; “[a] [ten percent] increase in
crime correspond[ed] to a [one percent] decline in city
population.”114 Cullen and Levitt also found that residents
motivated to move by fear of crime were more likely to remain in
the same metropolitan area than those moving for other reasons,
which suggests that the fear of crime encourages residents to move
to the suburbs. 115 And, importantly, even studies that question the
connection between fear and migration to the suburbs suggest that
crime exerts a relatively strong, and negative, influence on inmigration—that is, on residents’ decision to move from the suburbs
to the city.116 Moreover, while Cullen and Levitt’s study focused on
the connection between crime and out-migration to suburbs, fear of
crime undoubtedly also influences residents intra-locally as well,
with safer neighborhoods enjoying greater residential stability
than more dangerous ones.117
This connection between fear of crime and residential stability
is important because residential stability is strongly correlated
with collective efficacy.118 Not surprisingly, neighborhoods with
111. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
112. Id. at 418–19.
113. The empirical evidence in a variety of contexts supports Tiebout’s hypothesis. See
William A. Fischel, Footloose at 50: An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays, in
THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES
8–11 (William A. Fischel, ed., 2006). Critics, however, caution that Tieboutian competition
between municipalities has a dark side, enabling exclusionary zoning and contributing to
the intra-metropolitan inequities that concern regional government proponents. See Lee
Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY, supra, at 163–99.
114. Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences
for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 159 (1999).
115. Id. at 167.
116. See, e.g., Martin T. Katzman, The Contribution of Crime to Urban Decline, 17 URB.
STUD. 277 (1980).
117. See generally Cullen & Levitt, supra note 114 (examining connection between fear
of crime and out-migration to suburbs).
118. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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high levels of collective efficacy are healthier than those with lower
levels. Neighborhoods with low levels of collective efficacy exhibit
more signs of social distress—for example, they are more
dangerous and disorderly and residents are more fearful of
victimization—than those with higher levels. In a major
study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods, Robert Sampson, Stephen
Raudenbush, and Felton Earls found that residential stability,
measured by average residential tenure and levels of
homeownership, was one of three major factors explaining
neighborhood variation in collective efficacy, and that collective
efficacy, in turn, mediated the negative effects of the other two
factors—economic disadvantage and immigration—enough to
reduce violent crime in a neighborhood.119 These findings are
consistent with other social science research linking residential
tenure and homeownership, especially of single-family homes, with
high levels of collective efficacy.120
V. CONCLUSION: THE PLANNING FOR DENSITY
AND THE PEOPLE PARADOX
Proponents tend to agree that the best way to secure the
promises of planning for density is for residents to live—and
developers to build—in built-up areas rather than in new suburbs
on the outskirts of metropolitan regions. In other words, the
primary goal of planning for density is urban redevelopment.121
When considering what kinds of policies will advance that goal, it
is important to acknowledge that Americans’ suburban affinities
are not universally shared. Cities are not for everyone, to be sure.
But they are for some people. Just as some people would, if given
the opportunity, prefer to the live in suburbs—despite their many
flaws—so also would many people prefer to live in cities—despite
their many flaws. And, the way to increase the numbers of people
who fall into the latter category is to embrace the People Paradox,
which suggests busy-ness, not sterility, is what draws people to
urban life.
119. Sampson et al., supra note 100, at 921; Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 99
(“Systemic theories of urban communities have long pointed to the importance of residential
stability as a major feature of urban social organization.” (citation omitted)).
120. See, e.g., Chris L. Gibson et al., Social Integration, Individual Perceptions of
Collective Efficacy, and Fear of Crime in Three Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537, 540–43 (2002)
(collecting literature); Matthew R. Lee & Terri L. Earnest, Perceived Community Cohesion
and Perceived Risk of Victimization: A Cross-National Analysis, 20 JUST. Q. 131, 138–39
(2003); Wilcox et al., supra note 107, at 186–88.
121. A secondary goal, beyond the scope of this paper and embraced with particular
zeal by new urbanists, is the development of new, more-urban suburbs.
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The People Paradox also suggests partial solutions to the
economic and distribution perils of planning for density—although
these solutions are ones that many land use planners will find
discomfiting. In my view, the best way to achieve density
likely is persuasion, not coercion. The coercive tools in the
planning-for-density toolkit promoted by environmentalists and
regionalists seek to drive development back into urban centers by
increasing the cost of suburban growth. But they do little to
address myriad challenges to building healthy urban communities
that would-be city dwellers, rich and poor, care about deeply. The
form-based codes promoted by new urbanists offer expensive
aesthetic micromanagement of those challenges. But if we really
want to achieve the goal of density, the best way to do so is to
reduce the costs of living in cities and the costs of development in
cities. Coercive regulation will do neither. Furthermore, the People
Paradox suggests that discussions of planning for density are allto-frequently divorced from the discussions of managing the effects
of density. In particular, it suggests an overlooked connection
between policing practices and land use policies, a subject beyond
the scope of this Article about which I have written extensively
on.122
Finally, the people paradox suggests an overlooked connection
between land use policy and education policy. As Joel Kotkin has
observed, the young and hip may be attracted to busy cities, but
most creative people are middle-aged and middle class—not young
and hip. And middle-aged, middle class people continue to
gravitate to suburbs for the same reasons that their parents did:
schools. It is telling that, while many cities made a comeback in
recent years, the comeback was primarily driven by young people
and rich people. The population share of middle class families
living in cities continues to decline. Addressing the affordability of
urban life may be a necessary but not sufficient component of a
strategy to retain middle class families; addressing the educational
woes of urban schools is a critical component.123 But the perils and
paradoxes of education reform strategies are a subject for another
day.

122. See sources cited supra note 7.
123. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 201 (2010).
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